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POSTSCRIPTS

Refusal of Blood Transfusions:
A Rejection of Mootness

The Summer 1964 issue of The Catholic
Lawyer included a discussion of a United
States Court of Appeals decision, Application of the President and Directors of
Georgetown College, Which refused review
of a lower court determination ordering
a blood transfusion for an adult Jehovah's
Witness.' In that case the court reasoned
that, since the transfusion had been made
and the patient had subsequently recovered her health, the question presented
had become moot. Evaluating this rationale, the author of the article stated:
In the area of the conflicting interests of
the religious freedom of the individual and
the police power of the state, there appears

to be an increasing need for the higher
courts to formulate definitive standards,

thereby providing concrete guidelines for
the lower courts to follow. Movement toward such clarity will only be hampered

or stagnated by the mootness

argu-

ment .... 2

The decision seemed to represent the
viewpoint that all original findings in this
area would be non-reviewable, since the
actual transfusion would result in "instant
mootness."
A recent ruling of the Supreme Court of

Illinois3 was based on a similar factual
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2d. at 239.

260 (1964).

3Aste v. Brooks, 32 Ill. 361, 205 N.E.2d 435
(1965).

situation. The lower court had ordered a
blood transfusion for a non-consenting
adult Jehovah's Witness, who would have
died within a day without the treatment.
Although the transfusion had already been
made, the appellate court consented to review the order, and held it an unconstitutional invasion of the appellant's religious beliefs.
Justice Underwood, writing for the
court, reasoned that, with the many
religious doctrines accepted by various
segments of our society, there are beliefs
which may appear unreasonable to others
equally intelligent and devout in their religion. He noted that much of the religious persecution of the past had been
justified by the persecutors on the ground
that the activity suppressed was deemed
unreasonable by those in authority. Under
the first amendment, these grounds do not
validly support such interference, absent
present danger to the general welfare:
Even though we may consider appellant's
beliefs unwise, foolish or ridiculous, in the
absence of an overriding danger to society
we may not permit interference therewith.
. . . In the final analysis, what has happened here involves a judicial attempt to
decide what course of action is best for a
particular individual, notwithstanding that
individual's contrary views based upon
religious convictions. Such action cannot
be constitutionally countenanced.'
It must be noted that the court in this
41d. at 372, 205 N.E.2d at 442.
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case did not absolutely deny judicial authority to compel blood transfusions. It
distinguished the present factual situation
from that in Fitkin-Morgan Memorial
Hospital v. Anderson,' wherein a New Jersey court upheld an order authorizing a
transfusion for a pregnant woman, basing
its decision on the protection of the foetus.
The Georgetown College case was distinguished on the fact that the patient
therein was the mother of minor children
who might have become wards of the state
upon her death. The present case, therefore, did not deviate from former case law
relating to court-ordered medical treatment justified directly or indirectly by the
state's power of parens patriae. It is important, however, inasmuch as it rejected
the basic argument of Georgetown College
that such questions, being moot, are nonreviewable.
It has since been argued that this decision "amounted to approval of the right
to commit suicide."'6 This reasoning had
previously been discussed and rejected in
The Catholic Lawyer by Father John C.
Ford:
The person who commits suicide violates a
negative precept of the law of God: 'Thou
shalt not kill.' The moral situation of one
who fails to take affirmative measures to
keep himself alive is quite different, especially when the measures concerned are
artificial surgical procedures. . . .To kill
oneself is one thing. Not to avail oneself
of surgery is quite another.7
Father Ford reasoned that, even if the
patient were morally bound to accept

542 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377
U.S. 985 (1964).
8
N.Y. Times, March 20, 1965, p. 23, aol. 1.

7Ford, Refusal of Blood Transfusions by Jehovah's Witnesses, 10 CATHOLIC LAw. 212, 225
(1964).
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transfusions for the preservation of life,
the state is not empowered to enforce
that aspect of the moral law.
Regardless of the disagreement concerning suicide, it must be admitted that it was
undoubtedly appropriate for the court to
consider the important issues involved in
such a case, rather than to resolve the
question on the basis of mootness and to
dismiss the appeal, leaving a serious constitutional argument still unanswered.
Extension of the
"Good Samaritan Act"
In September 1964, the New York
"Good Samaritan Act"1 became effective.
This law immunizes doctors from liability
for injury or death resulting from emergency treatment rendered "without the expectation of monetary compensation," provided the doctor is not guilty of gross
negligence. In a timely discussion of this
statute, appearing in the Autumn 1964
edition of The Catholic Lawyer,2 the viewpoint was expressed that since the difficulty of successfully maintaining a malpractice action and the shifting of liability
from individuals to insurance carriers had
already alleviated much of the apprehension which discouraged physicians from
rendering emergency aid, the statutory
protection would not substantially further
stimulate doctors to volunteer medical assistance. It was concluded, however, that:
Theoretically, there can be no question that
the major benefit of the 'Good Samaritan
Act' will inure to the injured party who,
but for the enactment of such legislation,
would go unaided. . . .Certainly, a statute
(Continuedon page 214)
'N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6513 (10).
2Note, The New York "Good Samaritan Act,"
10 CATHOLIC LAW. 322 (1964).

